We solve in closed-form a Nash equilibrium model in which a finite number of exponential investors trade continuously with priceimpact over a finite time horizon. By comparing our continuous-time Nash equilibrium model to the otherwise identical competitive Radner equilibrium model, we show that our Nash equilibrium model with price-impact can simultaneously help resolve the interest rate puzzle, the equity premium puzzle, and the stock volatility puzzle.
Introduction
We provide a continuous-time Nash equilibrium model in which a finite number of investors with exponential utilities trade a stock that pays exogenous dividends and a money market account. The investors are strategic in that, when trading to maximize their expected utilities, they perceive that their individual stock holdings and orders have price-impact on the stock-price process. Our main theorem provides endogenously the equilibrium interest rate and stock-price process in closed-form. Unlike the analogous competitive Radner equilibrium, heterogeneity in stock endowments across investors plays an important role in our Nash equilibrium. 1 This is due to the price-impact property that sets our Nash model apart from the Radner model where investors act as price-takers.
Our main application shows that our continuous-time Nash equilibrium model produces non-trivial effects on the equilibrium interest rate and stock-price process relative to the analogous competitive Radner equilibrium. More specifically, by taking the competitive Radner equilibrium model as a baseline, when stock endowments are sufficiently heterogenous, our Nash equilibrium model can simultaneously decrease the equilibrium interest rate, increase the equity premium, and increase the stockprice volatility. In other words, our Nash equilibrium model can simultaneously help resolve the risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989) , the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) , and the volatility puzzle of LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) . For a survey of these puzzles and various ways to resolve them, we refer to Campbell (2000) . To the best of our knowledge, it is a new insight that the combination of investor heterogeneity in initial stock endowments and price impact can resolve these three puzzles simultaneously.
We model a financial market in which two independent Brownian motions drive the market-clearing stock price. One Brownian motion models the stock's exogenous dividends. The other Brownian motion models the floating available stock supply given by exogenous noise-trader order rates. Previous research shows that model incompleteness and consequent non-efficient risk-sharing equilibria can arise from several channels including: (i) Unspanned labor income as in the continuous-time Radner models in Christensen, Larsen, and Munk (2012), Žitković (2012) , Chris-tensen and Larsen (2014) , Choi and Larsen (2015) , Kardaras, Xing, andŽitković (2015) , Larsen and Sae-Sue (2016), and Weston andŽitković (2018). (ii) Limited stock-market participation and trading constraints as in the continuous-time Radner models in Basak and Cuoco (1999) and Hugonnier (2012) . (iii) Transaction costs as in the continuous-time Radner model in Weston (2018) . (iv) Quadratic penalties as in the continuous-time Radner models in Gârleanu and Pedersen (2016) and Bouchard, Fukasawa, Herdegen, and Muhle-Karbe (2018). (v) Trading targets as in the continuous-time Nash models in Brunnermeier and Petersen (2005) , Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2016) and Choi, Larsen, and Seppi (2019) . (vi) Price impact as in the discrete-time Nash model in Vayanos (1999) and the continuous-time Nash model in Basak (1997) .
Our continuous-time Nash equilibrium model falls into the last category (vi). The main differences to Vayanos (1999) are: (a) We have continuous-time trading. (b) We endogenously determine the equilibrium interest rate. (c) Our investors only differ in their initial stock endowments whereas Vayanos (1999) has idiosyncratic random stock endowment shocks over time. The main differences to Basak (1997) are: (a) We allow for multiple strategic traders and, thus, can consider heterogenous endowments across traders. (b) We allow for possible model incompleteness. (c) Our Nash equilibrium model with price-impact is time-consistent.
We follow Gârleanu and Pedersen (2016) and Bouchard, Fukasawa, Herdegen, and Muhle-Karbe (2018) and model possible aggregate noise-trader orders given by rate processes. It has long been recognized that noise traders can affect market equilibrium. For example, Hellwig (1980) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) use noise traders to create non-fully revealing rational expectation equilibria in models with asymmetric dividend information. While our investors do not have any private information (in particular, no private dividend information), unspanned noise in the stock supply lets us investigate price impact, investor heterogeneity, and asset pricing with model incompleteness.
We do not use a continuum model with uncountably many zero-mass investors such as the discrete-time models in Bewley (1977) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996) . For a continuous-time overview of mean-field models, we refer to Carmona and Delaure (2018a,b) . Unlike continuum models, our economy's aggregate endowment is the stock dividends. These dividends are exogenous and do not depend on the number of investors.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 sets up the individual optimization problems including the perceived price-impact functions. Sect. 3 contains our main theoretical result, which provides a Nash equilibrium in closed-form. In Sect. 4, we first provide the analogous competitive Radner equilibrium in closed-form, and then we show both analytically and in a calibrated example that our Nash model can simultaneously help resolve the risk-free puzzle, the equity premium puzzle, and the volatility puzzle. Sect. 5 outlines model extensions, and the Appendix contains all proofs.
Setup
We consider a real economy model with a single perishable consumption good, which we take as the model's numéraire. Trading takes place continuously for t ∈ [0, 1] whereas investors only consume at two discrete times t ∈ {0, 1}. 2 Given our intended asset-pricing application, the trading horizon here can be thought of as a year. The model has two securities available for continuous trading: A money market account and a stock. The stock has two exogenous dividend payments: a constant dividend D 0− ∈ R per share at time t = 0 and a random dividend D 1 per share at time t = 1. We determine endogenously the interest rate r (constant) and stock-price procesŝ S = (Ŝ t ) t∈[0,1] in both a Nash equilibrium with price impact (Theorem 3.2) and an analogous competitive Radner equilibrium (Theorem 4.3). Stock prices are denoted ex dividend.
Exogenous model inputs
Given the normalized one-unit trading time horizon, we let (D t , Y t ) t∈[0,1] be two independent one-dimensional Brownian motions with constant values (D 0 , Y 0 ) at time t = 0, zero drifts, and constant volatilities (σ 2 D , σ 2 Y ). The augmented standard Brow-2 When traders only consume at times t ∈ {0, 1}, the economy's equilibrium interest rate becomes constant and this makes the model tractable. Because of their intractability, only few incomplete models exist with stochastic interest rates for exponential investors. Christensen and Larsen (2014) develop an incomplete Radner equilibrium model with endogenously determined stochastic interest rates. We are not aware of an analogous Nash equilibrium model with price-impact and endogenously determined stochastic interest rates. nian filtration is denoted by
The Brownian motion D t represents information at time t ∈ [0, 1] about the time t = 1 terminal dividend D 1 . The initial value D 0 for the Brownian motion D t is conceptually different from the time t = 0 dividend payment D 0− . The martingale
shows that D t is the expected value of future dividends. The terminal equilibrium stock price is pinned down as:
The terminal condition (2.2) requires the equilibrium stock-price processŜ = (Ŝ t ) t∈[0,1] to be left-continuous at time t = 1. We refer to Ohasi (1991 Ohasi ( , 1992 for a discussion of (2.2). We model the asset-holding decisions of a group of j ∈ {1, ..., I} strategic traders. Traders begin with exogenous individual stock endowments equal to constants θ j,0− ∈ R for j ∈ {1, ..., I}. Their stock-holding processes over time are
given a constant θ j,0 ∈ R. The definition in (2.3) restricts traders to holding processes given by continuous order-rate processes θ j,t . This rate-process restriction has been used in various equilibrium models including Back, Cao, and Willard (2000), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), Gârleanu and Pedersen (2016), and Bouchard, Fukasawa, Herdegen, and Muhle-Karbe (2018). The holding process (2.3) has a time t = 0 value θ j,0 = θ j,0− + ∆θ j,0 and is continuously differentiable for t ∈ (0, 1) with time derivative θ j,t . Because trader j is allowed to place a block order ∆θ j,0 at time t = 0, the time t = 0 holdings θ j,0 will generally differ from the endowed holdings θ j,0− . We use holding processes as in (2.3) because Theorem 4.3 below shows that the Radner equilibrium has block orders at time t = 0 and continuous holdings afterwards. We normalize the strategic traders' endowed money market balances to zero. The total stock supply Y t held over time by the strategic traders is a randomly evolving stochastic process with drift term Y t and no martingale term. The supply Y t reflects the unmodeled decisions of noise traders. Let Y 0− ∈ R be the constant exogenous aggregate stock endowment held by the strategic traders
Following Gârleanu and Pedersen (2016) and Bouchard, Fukasawa, Herdegen, and Muhle-Karbe (2018), the stock supply process thereafter is defined by
The stock supply held at time t = 0 in (2.5) is given by the constant Y 0 ∈ R, where Y 0− − Y 0 is a possible aggregate block order at time t = 0 by the noise traders. We use the Brownian motion Y t to model the noise traders' exogenous random aggregate order rate in (2.5). By taking a time derivative in (2.5), the aggregate noise-trader order rate at time t ∈ (0, 1) is −Y t . Furthermore, from (2.5), the mean and variance
While the Brownian motion Y t modeling the order-rate process is a martingale, it starts at Y 0 ∈ R at time t = 0. Thus, from (2.6), the stock-supply process Y t has deterministic drift given by Y 0 . This can be used to model a growing economy by taking Y 0 > 0 or a shrinking economy by taking Y 0 < 0. When σ 2 Y > 0, no stock-price process can span all risk in the model because any model with two Brownian motions and only one stock is necessarily incomplete by the Second Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing. However, when σ Y = 0, all randomness in the model is due to the Brownian motion D t , and model completeness is possible.
The real-good consumption market-clearing condition at time t = 0 is
The constant c j,0 ∈ R in (2.7) is trader j's consumption at time t = 0 (to be deter-mined). The stock-market clearing condition for the aggregate supply and investor holdings at time t is
When all traders use holding processes given by continuous rate processes θ j,t , we can take time derivatives in (2.3), (2.5), and (2.8) to obtain
Finally, we turn to the strategic traders' utilities. To simplify our model, we assume that all strategic traders have identical exponential utility functions −e −a 0 x at time t = 0, −e −ax−δ at time t = 1, x ∈ R, (2.10)
where a 0 , a > 0 are their common risk aversion coefficients and δ ≥ 0 is their common time-preference parameter. The assumption of homogenous exponential utilities is common in many Nash equilibrium models, see, e.g., Vayanos (1999) . Sect. 5 below considers an extension with heterogenous exponential utilities. In (2.10), we allow for different risk aversion coefficients a 0 and a at times t = 0 and t = 1, since, in contrast to time t = 0 utility, the utility function at time t = 1 proxies for the value function at time t = 1 of both time t = 1 consumption and the remaining life-time consumption.
Individual utility-maximization problems
With price impact in our model, traders perceive that their holdings θ i,t and order rates θ i,t affect the prices at which they trade and their resulting wealth dynamics. In particular, price impact here is due to the impact holdings and trading of large strategic investors have on the market-clearing aggregate risk-bearing capacity of the market, and not as a microstructure friction. Thus, trader i's perceived wealth process is defined by
where θ i,t denotes her stock holdings, S i,t is her perceived stock-price process, and M i,t is her money-market balance (all these processes are to be determined in equilibrium).
In a Nash equilibrium model, the perceived stock-price processes S i,t in (2.11) can differ across investors given their different hypothetical holdings θ i,t and trades θ i,t but the equilibrium stock-price processŜ t is common for all traders. On the other hand, we assume all traders perceive the same constant interest rate r (to be determined).
Since stock prices are denoted ex dividend, the self-financing condition produces the initial wealth
where c i,0 is trader i's consumption at time t = 0 (to be determined). The expression for X i,0 in (2.12) follows from the normalization that all strategic traders have zero endowments in the money market account. The self-financing condition gives the wealth dynamics of (2.11) to be
As usual in continuous-time stochastic control problems, the traders' controls must satisfy various martingale conditions. Definition 2.1 (Admissibility). An order-rate process θ i = (θ i,t ) t∈[0,1] is admissible, and we write θ i ∈ A if:
(i) θ i has continuous paths and is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration F t in (2.1).
(ii) The stock-holding process θ i,t defined by (2.3) are such that there exists a constant K ≥ 0 such that
Based on the utility function in (2.10), trader i seeks to solve 3
given her perceived stock-price process S i,t in her wealth dynamics (2.13) . The next subsection derives stock-price dynamics perceived by trader i when solving (2.15) as part of our Nash equilibrium with price-impact. These perceived price dynamics differ from those in the competitive Radner equilibrium where all traders perceive the same stock-price and act as price-takers. We describe the analogous competitive Radner equilibrium in Sect. 4.1.
Price-impact for the stock market
The perceived stock-price process S i,t for trader i depends on market-clearing given how the other traders j ∈ {1, ..., I} \ {i} respond to hypothetical choices of (θ i,0 , θ i,t ) by trader i. Thus, for a Nash equilibrium, we must model how traders j, j = i, respond to an arbitrary control (θ i,0 , θ i,t ) used by trader i. Several different price-impact models are available in the literature: Continuoustime price-impact functions are given in Kyle (1985) and Back (1992) who take dS i,t to be affine in dθ i,t . Cvitanić and Cuoco (1998) take the drift process in dS i,t to be a function of θ i,t . The affine price-impact function (2.18) we derive below can be found in the single-trader optimal order-execution models in Almgren (2003) and Schied and Schöneborn (2009) . Our price-impact model can be seen as the continuous-time limit of the discrete-time Nash equilibrium model in Vayanos (1999) where S i,tn is affine in discrete orders ∆θ i,tn .
The following formulation of trader response functions is similar to Vayanos (1999) . For a fixed trader with index i ∈ {1, ..., I}, we conjecture that the responses used by other traders j, j = i, are given by
for constants (α, γ, ψ, ) and deterministic functions of time A(t), B(t), C(t), and F (t). Theorem 3.2 below determines these coefficients in equilibrium. The intuition behind (2.16) is that investors have base levels for their holdings θ j,0 and trades θ j,t that they then adjust given the price level relative to an adjusted dividend level. At the end of this subsection we interpret (2.16) as trader j deviating from equilibrium behavior.
The price-impact function trader i perceives in her optimization problem (2.15) is found using the stock-market clearing conditions (2.8) at time t = 0 and (2.9) for times t ∈ (0, 1) when summing (2.16):
Provided that α = 0 and A(t) = 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1), we can solve (2.17) for trader i's perceived market-clearing stock-price process:
(2.18)
Trader i's stock holdings (θ i,0 , θ i,t ) and orders θ i,t both affect the perceived stock-price process (2.18). Following Almgren (2003) .18) is called the permanent price-impact (positive in equilibrium) because the price-impact effect of past trading by investor i persists even after trading stops (when θ i,t = 0). The coefficient 1 (I−1)A(t) on the order rate θ i,t in (2.18) is called the temporary price-impact (positive in equilibrium) because the price-impact effect disappears when trading by investor i stops (i.e., when θ i,t = 0). Theorem 3.2 below ensures that the perceived stock-price process S i,t in (2.18) is continuous for t ∈ (0, 1] and satisfies the terminal dividend requirement (2.2). Remark 3.1.1 below gives sufficient conditions for the equilibrium stock-price processŜ t to be continuous also at time t = 0.
To see that (2.15 ) is a quadratic minimization problem for the perceived stock-price process (2.18), we use the money-market account balance process M i,t from (2.11)
as a state-process. By using (2.12), the initial value of (2.19) is given by
Furthermore, the wealth dynamics (2.13) produce the following dynamics of the money-market account balance process
(2.21)
The second equality in (2.21) uses the quadratic variation property θ i , S i t = 0, which holds because θ i,t satisfies the order-rate condition (2.3). As shown in the proofs in Appendix A, the affinity in the price-impact function (2.18) and the last line in (2.21) make the individual optimization problems (2.15) tractable. Trader i's control (θ i,0 , θ i,t ) appears only implicitly in trader j's response (2.16) through the stock-price process S i = (S i,t ) t∈[0,1] , but inserting (2.18) into (2.16) makes this dependence explicit:
For j = i, the response functions (2.22) give trader j's response directly in terms of trader i's controls (θ i,0 , θ i,t ) and associated holdings θ i,t , and we see that trader j's response is affine in those quantities. Furthermore, the equilibrium holdings (θ i,0 ,θ j,0 ,θ i,t ,θ j,t ) and order-rate processes (θ i,t ,θ j,t ) in (3.7) in Theorem 3.2 below can be used to re-write (2.22) as
Thus, the responses in (2.23) describe deviations of (θ j,0 , θ j,t ) from equilibrium behavior (θ j,0 ,θ j,t ) for trader j in response to off-equilibrium deviations of (θ i,0 , θ i,t ) from (θ i,0 ,θ i,t ) for trader i. Note here that the equilibrium holdings (θ i,0 ,θ j,0 ,θ i,t ,θ j,t ) and order-rate processes (θ i,t ,θ j,t ), j = i, in (2.23) do not depend on trader i's arbitrary orders θ i,t and holdings (θ i,0 , θ i,t ).
Continuous-time Nash equilibria
The definition of a Nash equilibrium in our settings is as follows: (ii) The stock-price processes resulting from inserting trader i's optimizer (θ i,0 ,θ i,t ) into the price-impact function S i,t in (2.18) are identical for all traders i ∈ {1, ..., I}. This common stock-price process, denoted byŜ t , satisfies the terminal dividend restriction (2.2).
(iii) The individual equilibrium holding processes
The real-good consumption market clearing condition (2.7) holds at time t = 0.
(v) The stock-market clearing condition (2.8) holds at all times t ∈ [0, 1].
♦
Our main existence result is the following (the proof is in Appendix A):
Then, there exist unique smooth solutions to the coupled system of ODEs:
, Q 11 (1) = 0,
and the functions
are well-defined for t ∈ [0, 1] such that a Nash equilibrium exists in which:
(i) The constant equilibrium interest rate r ∈ R is given by
The equilibrium stock-price process is given bŷ
5)
where α := e r (I−2)
, t ∈ [0, 1),
(iv) For i ∈ {1, ..., I}, trader i's optimal consumption and optimal holding at time t = 0 as well as optimal order-rate process at times t ∈ (0, 1) are:
1. While both the perceived stock-price processes S i,t in (2.18) given (3.6) and the equilibrium stock-price processŜ t in (3.5) evolve continuously for t ∈ (0, 1] with the limit (2.2) at time t = 1, they are in general not right continuous at time t = 0. In the case σ Y := 0, the equilibrium stock-price processŜ t in (3.5)
where we have used the representations in (3.6) and (A.10) in Appendix A.
Consequently, when σ Y := 0, we see from (3.9) that the equilibrium stock-price processŜ t is continuous
, the time t = 0 equilibrium holdingsθ i,0 for trader i depend on the endowed holdings θ i,0− . This is different from the Radner equilibrium in Theorem 4.3 below where the time t = 0 equilibrium holdings for trader i are Y 0 /I regardless of trader i's endowed holdings θ i,0− . It is this difference that ultimately allows our Nash equilibrium model to simultaneously resolve the risk-free rate, equity premium, and volatility asset pricing puzzles in Sect. 4.2.
3. The explicit solution for investor holdings from (3.7) iŝ
The expression for B(t) in (A.17) in Appendix A produces the negative upper bound
Because the bound (3.11) integrates to negative infinity for t ∈ [0, 1), the second term on the right in (3.10) vanishes. Therefore, the limit of (3.10) is
Consequently, on the Nash equilibrium paths, strategic traders share the stock supply evenly toward the end of the time horizon.
4. As we shall see in Lemma 4.5 below, the Nash equilibrium can be strictly different from the analogous competitive Radner equilibrium in Theorem 4.3. When σ Y := 0, the competitive Radner equilibrium constitutes a complete model and therefore is Pareto efficient by the First Welfare Theorem. It is a consequence of Lemma 4.5 below, that even in the complete model case where σ Y := 0, the Nash equilibrium with price-impact is not Pareto efficient.
5. The proofs of Theorem 3.2 and 4.3 in Appendix A are based on the standard dynamical programming principle (HJB equations), and, so by definition, the individual optimization problems in our Nash and Radner equilibrium models are time-consistent. However, it might appear our Nash equilibrium model is time-inconsistent given that the optimal holdingsθ i,t in (3.10) depend on the endowed holding θ i,0− (see, e.g., the discussion in Remark 3 on p.455 in Basak, 1997) . The explanation for why our Nash equilibrium is time-consistent while the holdingsθ i,t depend on the endowment θ i,0− lies in the state-processes and controls used in the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 4.3, summarized in Table 1 : 
State processes
For time-consistent optimization problems, the initial control values cannot appear in the optimal controls. However, because θ i,t is the control -not θ i,tin the Nash equilibrium model, the endowments θ i,0− can (and do) appear in the time-consistent individual optimal holdingsθ i,t in (3.10). Likewise, for the Radner equilibrium model in Theorem 4.3 to be time-consistent, the endowment θ i,0 cannot (and do not) appear in the individual optimal Radner holdings Y t /I in (4.6).
Walras' law ensures clearing in all markets at all times. 
Asset pricing puzzles
This section shows that the continuous-time Nash equilibrium model with priceimpact produces non-trivial differences relative to the analogous competitive Radner model where all utility-maximizing investors act as price takers. First, Theorem 4.3 below obtains existence of a competitive Radner equilibrium by altering the factorloading coefficients in (3.5) . Second, we show the Nash equilibrium model's ability to simultaneously help to resolve the three main asset pricing puzzles (risk-free rate, equity premium, and volatility). We do this first analytically, and secondly we illustrate the equilibrium differences in a calibrated example.
Competitive Radner equilibrium
The following definition of admissibility does not restrict traders to use order-rate processes but rather allows block orders at all times t ∈ [0, 1]. However, Theorem 4.3 below shows it is only optimal to submit block orders at time t = 0 in the Radner equilibrium. holding process θ i = (θ i,t ) t∈[0,1) is admissible, and we write θ i ∈ A Rad if:
(i) θ i is progressively measurable with respect to the augmented filtration (2.1).
(ii) A constant K ≥ 0 exists such that (2.14) holds.
♦
In the competitive Radner equilibrium, the perceived stock-price dynamics are identical across all traders and are independent of their holdings and orders in their respective optimization problems:
In our setting, the definition of a competitive Radner equilibrium is the following: 
such that a competitive Radner equilibrium exists in which:
(i) The constant equilibrium interest rate r Rad ∈ R is given by (ii) The equilibrium stock-price process is given by
5)
where γ(t) := e −r Rad (1−t) .
(iii) Each trader optimally uses the order-rate process Y t I ; that is, the optimal holding processes have dynamics given by
Furthermore, trader i's optimal consumption at time t = 0 iŝ
(4.7)
Lemma 4.5 in the next section gives sufficient conditions for the Radner equilibrium interest rate r Rad in (4.4) to be larger than the Nash equilibrium interest rate r in (3.4) as is needed to resolve the risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989) . The next result shows that when r Rad ≥ r, the aggregate expected utility for all utility maximizing traders is higher in the Radner equilibrium compared to the Nash equilibrium. We start by defining the aggregate welfare levels for the utility-maximizing traders as
where the certainty equivalents CE i and CE Rad i are defined implicitly by 
Asset pricing puzzles
This section compares the Nash equilibrium and competitive Radner equilibrium. The take-away is that, by using the competitive Radner equilibrium model as a benchmark, our Nash equilibrium model with price impact can simultaneously help resolve the risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989) , the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) , and the volatility puzzle of LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) .
To address these three asset pricing puzzles, we start with the following analytic comparative statistics. The empirical work on asset pricing puzzles referenced above compares a competitive representative agent model with historical data. Such representative agent models are complete and therefore also Pareto efficient. For consistency, we specialize our benchmark Radner equilibrium model to be Pareto efficient by setting σ Y := 0 in the following analysis. Furthermore, to have the continuity property of the Nash equilibrium stock-price process at time t = 0 in (3.9), we also assume Y 0 = Y 0− + 2Y 0 in the following. 
where the Q functions are in (3.3) and q functions are in (4.2).
2. WhenŜ 0 , S Rad 0 > 0, the equity premia for the two equilibrium stock-price processes (Ŝ t , S Rad t ) in (3.5) and (4.5) are defined as:
Furthermore, when σ Y = 0 and Y 0 = Y 0− +2Y 0 , the equity premia (4.11) become
3. When σ Y = 0 and Y 0 = Y 0− + 2Y 0 , the equilibrium stock-price processes (Ŝ t , S Rad t ) in (3.5) and (4.5) have quadratic variation processes with dynamics
Furthermore, when the interest-rate difference (4.10) is non-negative and the parameter restriction
First, consider the risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989) . In a nutshell, competitive models predict the interest rate to be too high compared to empirical evidence. When Y 0 = Y 0− , Y 0 = 0, and σ Y := 0, the interest-rate difference (4.10) simplifies to
The inequality in (4.15) is produced by Cauchy-Schwartz's inequality. Therefore, in the complete competitive Radner equilibrium model with σ Y := 0 without time t = 0 noise-trader block orders (i.e., Y 0 = Y 0− so Y 0 = 0), the Nash equilibrium with price impact strictly reduces the equilibrium interest rate unless the strategic traders are identically endowed with θ i,0− = Y 0− I . When (4.14) holds, Lemma A.1 in Appendix A shows that q 23 (t) ≤ Q 23 (t) and q 33 (t) ≤ Q 33 (t). Therefore, if (4.14) holds, the first term in (4.10) is non-positive:
Consequently, when Y 0 = 0 and (4.14) holds, the interest-rate difference (4.10) is positive only if I j=1 θ 2 j,0− is sufficiently large relative to Y 2 0− I . Second, consider the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) . In a nutshell, competitive models predict the stock's excess return over the risk-free rate to be too low compared to empirical evidence. Lemma 4.5 provides the Nash and Radner equity premia in closed form.
Third, consider the volatility puzzle of LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) . In a nutshell, competitive models predict a stock-price volatility that is too low compared to empirical evidence. We use the stock's quadratic variation process as a proxy for stock-price volatility. Lemma 4.5 ensures that Ŝ t is larger than S Rad t whenever (4.14) holds and r Rad ≥ r. Below, Fig. 1B illustrates numerically that ( IC−1 IA ) 2 is larger than γ 2 β 2 and Fig. 1C illustrates that F 2 is larger than γ 2 . In other words, the Nash equilibrium stock-price process is more volatile compared to the analogous stock-price process in the competitive Radner equilibrium.
Finally, we present numerics to illustrate that all three asset pricing puzzles can be resolved simultaneously by a single set of model parameters. We think of the unit time horizon as one year and use the input parameters: δ := 0.1, a 0 := 2, a := 1, I :
(4.17)
We choose a 0 > a because the time t = 1 utility in (2.10) also reflects the value function of remaining life-time consumption. To ensure model completeness of the benchmark Radner equilibrium model, we set σ Y := 0. To ensure continuity of the Nash equilibrium stock-price at time t = 0, we require Y 0 = Y 0− + 2Y 0 (see (3.9) ). We calibrate the remaining five model parameters (Y 0 , Y 0 , I i=1 θ 2 i,0− , D 0 , σ D ) such that the Nash and Radner equilibrium outputs take the values:
r Rad = 7%, r = 5%, EP = 12%, EP Rad = 9%, Ŝ 1 − S Rad 1 = (10%) 2 . (4.18)
We chose these output values to illustrate that the numerical impact of price impact in our Nash equilibrium can be significant. For simplicity, we do not calibrate the model to Ŝ 1 and S Rad 1 separately although this is perfectly possible by varying one of the parameters in (4.17) . This procedure produces the calibrated parameters: Keeping in mind that our model is a single good real economy, we interpret the calibrated terms in (4.19) as the strategic traders hold a positive supply of shares (Y 0 > 0) at time t = 0 and that their holdings are expected to grow over time as the economy grows (combine (2.6) with Y 0 > 0). This is consistent with the strategic traders requiring a positive equity premium on their stock holding over the risk-free rate. The expected terminal stock price (2.2) is E[D 1 ] = D 0 > 0 with volatility σ 2 D = 0.542. Table 2 reports calibrated equilibrium outputs of both the Nash and Radner models. 4 As mentioned in Remark 3.1.2 and discussed after (4.15), the key quantity in explaining the asset pricing puzzles is the size of the difference I j=1 θ 2 j,0− − 1 I Y 2 0− ≥ 0, which measures endowment dispersion across investors. In the calibrated example with parameters as in (4.17) and (4.19) , this difference is 136.742. Table 2 also reports numbers when σ Y = 0 and the benchmark Radner model is incomplete. We see from rows 3-6 in Table 2 , that the Nash equilibrium outputs are robust to even extreme values of the noise-trader volatility such as σ Y = 100% and σ Y = 500%. 1 plots the stock-price coefficients in the Nash equilibrium (3.5) and in the competitive Radner equilibrium (4.5). Fig. 1 shows that not only do the stock-price coefficients differ, but their time trajectories are ordered over time. Figure 1 : Trajectories of the equilibrium stock-price coefficients in the Nash model (3.5) and in the competitive Radner model (4.5) for t ∈ [0, 1). The model parameters are given in (4.17) and (4.19) , and the trading interval [0, 1) is discretized into 10,000 rounds of trading. . 1A shows the sensitivity of stock prices to the stock supply Y t held by the strategic traders is quantitatively similar in the Nash and Radner equilibria. However, Fig. 1B-C show that the Nash stock price sensitivity to the stock supply rate Y t and the dividend expectation D t are both significantly larger in magnitude in the Nash equilibrium than in the Radner equilibrium.
Model extensions
The following extensions illustrate our model's analytical robustness to two model variations.
Inhomogeneous utilities
In addition to the I traders with utilities as in (2.10), we can introduce a second group of traders indexed by i ∈ {I + 1, ..., I +Ī},Ī ∈ N, with utilities given by −e −ā 0 x at time t = 0, −e −āx−δ at time t = 1, x ∈ R, (5.1)
with different coefficientsā 0 ,ā > 0 andδ ≥ 0. In this setting, a Nash equilibrium is given by constants (α, γ, , ψ,ᾱ,γ,¯ ,ψ) and deterministic functions of time A(t), B(t), C(t), F (t),Ā(t),B(t),C(t) . The response function for trader i ∈ {1, ..., I} is as in (2.16) whereas for trader i ∈ {I + 1, ..., I +Ī} we define the response function
There are two different perceived stock-price processes with price-impact. For trader i ∈ {1, ..., I}, the stock-price process subject to trader i's choice of (θ i,0 , θ i,t ) is found by solving
for (S i,0 , S i,t ). Similarly, for trader i ∈ {I +1, ..., I +Ī}, the stock-price process subject to trader i's choice of (θ i,0 , θ i,t ) is found by solving
for (S i,0 , S i,t ).
By doubling the number of Q functions in (3.2), the existence result in Theorem 3.2 can be modified to include this extension.
Penalties
In this section we replace the objective (2.15) with
where L i,1 is a penalty term. We consider two specifications of L i,1 . First, we can incorporate high-frequency traders (HFTs) who are incentivized to hold zero positions over time. We do this by defining the penalty processes:
The deterministic function κ : [0, 1] → [0, ∞) in (5.6) is a penalty-severity function.
The strength of κ(t) for t ∈ [0, 1] can vary periodically for times during overnight periods vs during trading days to give HFTs stronger incentive to hold no stocks overnight. Similar to the extension in subsection 5.1, it is also possible to consider multiple groups of homogenous traders where traders in different groups have identical penalty functions but different groups can have different penalty-severity functions. Second, we can approximate transaction costs by penalizing the trading rates (as in, e.g., Gârleanu and Pedersen 2016). We do this by defining the penalty processes: The constant λ > 0 in (5.7) is interpreted as a transaction cost parameter. By altering the ODEs in (3.2), the existence result in Theorem 3.2 can be modified to include both penalties (5.6) and (5.7) and linear combinations of (5.6) and (5.7).
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.2 (Nash existence).
Step 1 (ODEs): In this step, we prove that I ≥ 3 ensures that the coupled ODEs (3.2) have unique solutions for t ∈ [0, 1]. We start by showing that the two-dimensional initial value problem:
has unique solutions for t ∈ [0, ∞). For notational simplicity, we give the proof only for the parameters σ D := σ Y := 1. First, we need a local Lipshitz estimate and we denote by G(t, y 1 , y 2 ) := G 1 (t,y 1 ,y 2 )
the right-hand-side of (A.1). For m > 0, t ≥ 0, and for u = ( u 1 u 2 ) , x = ( x 1 x 2 ) ∈ B(0, m) we have:
as well as 
The local Lipschitz structure of (A.1) produces a unique solution around the point t = 0 by the Picard-Lindelöf theorem (see, e.g., Theorem II.1.1 in Hartman 2002). Furthermore, there exists a maximal interval of existence (t,t) ⊆ [−∞, ∞] and we will argue by contradiction to show thatt = ∞.
Because y 1 and y 2 are differentiable, the ODEs in (A.1) imply that y 1 and y 2 also exist. Similarly, y 2 exists. By taking derivates through (A.1) and inserting the initial values y 1 (0) = y 2 (0) = 0 into these derivatives at t = 0, we find A similar argument for y 2 produces an > 0 such that for all t ∈ (0, ), we have y 1 (t) > 0 and y 2 (t) > 0.
To reach a contradiction witht < ∞, we define t 0 as t 0 := inf{t > 0 : y 1 (t) = 0 or y 2 (t) = 0}, (A.8)
which is the first time (y 1 or y 2 ) reaches zero strictly after time t = 0. According to the previous argument, there exists > 0 such that t 0 ≥ . If t 0 <t, then there are two possibilities: (i) In case y 1 (t 0 ) = 0, then the ODE gives y 1 (t 0 ) = a I(I−1) t 0 > 0, which contradicts the definition of t 0 . (ii) In case y 2 (t 0 ) = 0, then the ODEs produce
This also contradicts the definition of t 0 . Therefore, we conclude that y 1 (t) > 0 and y 2 (t) > 0 for t ∈ (0,t). This observation and the ODEs (A.1) imply
Therefore, by integration and using the initial values y 1 (0) = y 2 (0) = 0, we find constants (const 1 , const 2 ) such that We conclude this step by constructing solutions to the ODEs (3.2). For t ∈ [0, 1], we define the functions Then, because F (t) → 1 as t ↑ 1 and because θ i,t is left-continuous at t = 1, the left limit of the perceived price processes (2.18) is given by
for any admissible order-rate processes θ i,t .
Step 3 (Individual optimality for t ∈ (0, 1)): In this step, we define the function
In (A.13) , the deterministic Q functions are defined in (3.2)-(A.10), and Q 5 (t) := e r(1−t) . We show next that the function v in
To see this, let θ i,t be an arbitrary admissible order-rate process. Itô's lemma shows that the process
The local martingale on the second line in (A.15) can be upgraded to a martingale because of the bound placed on θ i,t in (2.14) and Corollary 3.5.16 in Karatzas and Shreve (1988) . Furthermore, because the drift in (A.15) is non-negative, we see that v is a submartingale for all admissible order-rate processes θ i,t . The second-order condition for the HJB equation is
This condition holds because inserting Q 11 (t) and Q 13 (t) from (A.10) into B(t) in (3.6) produces
which is strictly negative. Therefore, A(t) given in (3.6) is strictly positive and the second-order condition (A.16) holds. The candidate optimizer in (3.7) with solution (3.10) ensures that the drift in
for t ∈ [0, 1). To see thatθ i,t has a finite limit as t ↑ 1, we bound the time derivative of (3.10) as follows:
We can use (A.17) once more to see
(A.20)
Because I ≥ 4 and Q 23 (1) = 0, the last term in (A.20) has a finite limit as t ↑ 1. All in all, this shows the admissibility requirements in Definition 2.1 and, hence, optimality of (3.7) follows.
Step 4 (Individual optimality for t = 0): To determine the time t = 0 optimal consumption and holdings, we solve the following optimization problem:
where the Q functions are evaluated at t = 0 and M i,0 is defined in (2.20) . Simultaneously optimizing (A.21) over θ i,0 and c i,0 produces the expressions in (3.7).
Step 5 (Clearing): The interest rate (3.4) ensures that (ĉ 1,0 , ...,ĉ I,0 ) defined in (3.7)
sum to D 0− Y 0− as required in (2.7). The constants (α, γ, , ψ) in (3.6) ensure that (θ 1,0 , ...,θ I,0 ) defined in (3.7) sum to Y 0 . Furthermore, whenθ i,0 is inserted into the first line of (2.18), the resulting expression for stock prices does not depend on i. Similarly, the deterministic functions A(t), B(t), C(t), F (t) in (3.6) ensure stockmarket clearing at all times t ∈ (0, 1). Finally, the terminal stock-price condition (2.2) for the equilibrium stock-price processŜ t in (3.5) holds by the argument given in where r is a constant interest rate, and define the discounted stock-price and optimal wealth processesS 
By combining these two properties and using Definition 3.1(iv), we find
where θ (0) t denotes the noise traders' holdings in the money market and θ Step 1 (ODEs): This step is similar -but simpler -than Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3.2 and here we only outline the changes: Define x 1 (t) := q 23 (1 − t) and x 2 (t) := q 33 (1 − t) so that the ODEs for (q 23 , q 33 ) in (4.2) become: Next, we show that the value function for investor i's individual optimization problem (A.14) is given by v Rad (t, X, Y, Y ) := e −a q 5 (t)X+q 0 (t)+q 22 
where q 5 (t) := e r Rad (1−t) and t ∈ [0, 1] and X, Y, Y ∈ R. To see this, let θ i ∈ A Rad be arbitrary. Itô's lemma and the ODEs in (4.2) produce the dynamics of v Rad = v Rad (t, X i,t , Y t , Y t ) to be dv Rad = v Rad a 2 q 5 (t) 2 (β(t) 2 + γ(t) 2 ) (Y t − Iθ i,t ) 2 2I 2 dt − aθ i,t γ(t)dD t + β(t)dY t − a q 23 (t)Y t + 2q 33 (t)Y t dY t .
(A.31) Therefore, the process v Rad is a submartingale for θ i ∈ A Rad arbitrary and a martingale forθ Rad i,t defined in (4.6). As in (A.21), we can use (2.12) to rewrite the optimization problem where the q functions are evaluated at t = 0. The optimizers for (A.32) are given in (4.6) and (4.7).
Step 3 (Clearing): The interest rate r Rad in (4.4) ensures that the optimal time t = 0 consumption constants in (4.7) clear the goods market in the sense that they sum to D 0− Y 0− as in (2.7). Obviously, the optimal holding strategiesθ Rad i,t in (4.6) clear the stock market. Finally, to see that the terminal price restriction (2.2) holds, we use the terminal conditions α(1) = 0 and β(1) = 0 in the Radner equilibrium stock-price (4.5). Proof. We argue by contradiction and suppose that the lemma's conclusion is false.
From the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 4.3 we know that y 1 , y 2 , x 1 , x 2 ≥ 0. Furthermore, for t > 0 small, we have x 1 (t) < y 1 (t) and x 2 (t) < y 2 (t) for t > 0 because y 1 (0) = y 2 (0) = y 1 (0) = y 2 (0) = 0, Because the lemma's conclusion is assumed false there exists t * ∈ (0, 1] such that t * = inf t > 0 : y 1 (t) = x 1 (t) or y 2 (t) = x 2 (t) .
(A.38)
Consider the two cases: (i) If y 2 (t * ) = x 2 (t * ), the definition of t * implies that y 1 (t * ) ≥ x 1 (t * ). The ODE for y 2 in (A.1) and the ODE for x 2 in (A.27) produce y 2 (t * ) > x 2 (t * ). However, the definition of t * implies the contradiction y 2 (t * ) ≤ x 2 (t * ).
(ii) If y 1 (t * ) = x 1 (t * ), the definition of t * implies that y 2 (t * ) ≥ x 2 (t * ) and y 1 (t * ) ≤ x 1 (t * ). The ODEs (A.1) and (A.27) produce the following inequalities and implications: (A.39)
We have: The first inequality uses y 1 (t * ) ≤ x 1 (t * ) (because of the definition of t * ) and the The dynamics (A.43) produce quadratic variation processes: 
